The political, ecological and organizational determinants of neighborhood action | | Posted on:1994-03-26 | Degree:Ph.D | Type:Dissertation | | University:The Ohio State University | Candidate:Mesch, Gustavo Sergio | Full Text:PDF | | GTID:1476390014494605 | Subject:Sociology | | Abstract/Summary: | PDF Full Text Request | | Neighborhoods both in cities and suburbs, face forces that threaten their social and physical environment. Faced with such threats, some neighborhoods marshall their resources to stop new developments and physical decline. Others, unable to respond, resign themselves to leaving the character of their areas subject to external forces.;The purpose of this research is to study the determinants of organized neighborhood collective action and to learn how this action has been enhanced by material and political incentives for community organization made available by local governments. In studying the determinants of neighborhood response I suggest an integrative model of local action based on the theoretical frameworks of Political Economy, Resource Mobilization and Human Ecology. In this model the political action of neighborhood associations is a function of environmental threats, population social composition, resource mobilization and political incentives available to the community.;The model is tested using data collected from a survey of 105 neighborhood associations in the city of Columbus (Ohio) and its suburbs.;The study finds that the fundamental goal of neighborhood organization is to protect the residential environment. Potential changes such as new developments and land use are the best predictors of neighborhood action. Socioeconomic status and race composition had an indirect effect on collective action. Predominantly African American and low income neighborhoods are more active, because are located in areas that experience high environmental threats such as crime and housing deterioration. Organizational resources are found to shape the extent of collective action. The most important resources are those that result from links with other neighborhood based organizations. Political incentives for organization negatively influence collective action. In part, because these incentives are allocated to associations in wealthy neighborhoods that do not face environmental threats. Implications of the findings for urban theory are discussed. | | Keywords/Search Tags: | Neighborhood, Action, Political, Threats, Determinants, Organization | PDF Full Text Request | Related items |
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