| Political partisanship is an unavoidable feature of most modern democracies. However, most political theorists and philosophers either derogate or ignore partisanship in their theorizing. Partisanship advocates such as Nancy Rosenblum believe that partisanship receives little appreciation because theorists have been engaged in "ideal" theorizing. In this dissertation, I examine whether theorizing at a more nonideal level can support a robust defense of political parties and their partisans as beneficial features of modern democratic societies. I argue that while nonideal conditions can justify certain partisan behavior as a transition toward more ideal circumstances, a justification for entrenched political parties is much harder to make and that serious concerns about political partisanship remain even at the level of nonideal theory. In order to make this argument, I begin by examining the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory. I then articulate two distinct nonideal strategies to which defenders of partisanship appeal in making their case for partisanship. I term these strategies, after Amartya Sen's work, the "transcendental nonideal" and the "comparative nonideal". I then argue that the most effective case for partisanship relies on the transcendental nonideal strategy, but justifies political parties as transient entities rather than entrenched features of democratic societies. The comparative nonideal strategy, which could justify such entrenched political parties, is on much weaker ground. This is due to the fact that the kind of partisanship that would be justified under this strategy is itself highly idealized. |
