BETWEEN HEGEL AND HEIDEGGER: AN ESSAY ON DIALECTIC AND DIFFERENCE

This dissertation brings Hegel and Heidegger into confrontation in order to answer the question: Is the questionning of Heidegger radical enough to undercut the foundation of the Hegelian system, or is the thought of Heidegger to be located within that system?;The first chapter analyzes Heidegger's critique of Hegel's concept of time. Although Heidegger claims to oppose his concept of time to Hegel's, we found that both agree that the thinking of Being is inescapably tied to an ecstatic concept of time, and this temporality of ontology must be thought. However, Hegel and Heidegger disagree on the consequences of this connection of Being and time: for Hegel, it is the systematic grounding of thought; for Heidegger, it is the groundlessness of any ground of thought.;We then discovered that both Hegel and Heidegger agree that an ecstatic concept of time implies an identity of Being and Nothing, and that this identity is original. Yet, they disagree on the consequences of this: for Hegel, this identity points to the inner infinity of the thinking of Being; for Heidegger, it is evidence for the finitude of the thinking of Being.;The third chapter examines the question of the beginning. Both Hegel and Heidegger are in accord characterizing the beginning as the movement of origination, rather than as a starting point; both name the circularity of the question of beginning as an essential characteristic of the thinking of Being. But, for Hegel, this circularity is a description of the return of thought to itself, while, for Heidegger it is the reason why thought remains homeless.;We restrict this issue to the way in which Heidegger approaches it in his critique of Hegel. This does not mean that we are submitting the contest between Hegel and Heidegger to the judgment of Heidegger, but that Heidegger's critique of Hegel opens our access to the confrontation. The dialogue between them emerges in venturing a possible Hegelian critique of Heideggers critique of Hegel.;Next we examine what Heidegger contends are the illegitimate presuppositions of the Hegelian system, in particular the parousia of the Absolute, the identity which surmounts all difference, is the highest forgetfulness of this task. In opposition to Heidegger, Hegel would reply that the thought of the Absolute is the true outcome and source of any difference; furthermore, difference which is thought properly (dialectically) is thought as this higher identity.;The fifth chapter deepens this issue of the thought of difference by examining evidence which Hegel and Heidegger offer for their respective answers to this thought. For Heidegger, technology makes present the need for the thought of the ontological difference by appearing as the forgetfulness of it, while language, as self-concealing, becomes a clue to how the ontological difference is to be thought. For Hegel, work and its context, the ethical State, demonstrate the dialectical movement leading to Absolute Spirit, while the reconciliation of tragedy shows how this final healing of difference is to be thought.;Finally, we examine Hegel and Heidegger as interpreters of Heraclitus. Again we discover them in accord in what each finds significant for thought, but opposed in the way each determines its meaning and consequences.;In the conclusion, we speculate about the significance of the proximity and entanglement of the thought of the ontological difference and of dialectic.