Three essays on the international diffusion of technology

I examine the positive and normative consequences of unintended transfers of industrial "know how" across countries. All three essays examine how unintended transfers (or diffusion) affect international markets for R&D intensive goods, however the weight given to strategic considerations varies across essays. The first two essays investigate variants of a strategic game between a technologically advanced North, and a less advanced South. Innovators and imitators endeavor to protect or "pirate" the intellectual property embodied in Northern products, while the Southern government facilitates imitation by lowering the stringency of Southern patent protection. Therefore, the appropriability regime is set endogenously and combines elements of Northern technology "masqueing" with the less than perfect protection Southern patents provide. The third essay presents a new dynamic formulation of the continuum Ricardian model and investigates the role of intellectual property rights in trade, growth, and technology transfer. Overall, the results indicate less stringent Southern protection for intellectual property shifts rents from North to South and may magnify unintended transfers of technology. In a growth context, a lack of protection for innovations created abroad distorts the pattern of trade, lowers aggregate R&D, and in many cases reduces worldwide growth.