| The regulation of pre-paid funeral trust funds by the California State Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers was initiated in 1965 by an act of the Legislature which created the appearance of public protection while providing substantial financial benefits to the regulated industry. This dissertation seeks to combine an analysis of a particular type of public administration, state occupational licensing, with a study of the political behavior and public law commonly associated with it. An analysis of the legislative history, major judicial decisions and substantial administrative record of California's pre-need funeral trust law provides documentation of the problems associated with a law characterized by special exemptions, ambiguous language, broad delegations of authority, and inadequate funds for implementation.; This type of legislation provides a classic formula for delegating industry conflicts to the administrative arena where the actual details of the program can be worked out by the agency in partnership with those who have the most to gain from the process. The development of inconsistent and inappropriate regulatory policies combined with inadequate enforcement capability created an environment which was fertile for fraud and self-dealing but which attracted little public attention because major misappropriations of trust funds were usually resolved through quiet negotiations.; A change of regime generated by the appointment of strong public members to the Board resulted in more aggressive enforcement activities and a public recommendation to the Legislature to deregulate preneed funeral arrangements by prohibiting funeral directors from acting as trustees. These activities disturbed the longstanding industry-board equilibrium and shifted the conflict back to the legislature where the large preneed sellers have been extremely effective in obtaining legislative approval for new regulatory schemes which would greatly increase their ability to use preneed trust income to promote their sales programs by couching their claims for increased benefits in the hortatory language of consumer protection. For four years, however, these bills have been vetoed by two governors of different political persuasions. Until the conflict is resolved, the regulating agency is left without the resources or direction to plan its activities or fulfill its responsibilities in a fair, equitable or credible manner. |
