| This study critically analyzes the existing general theories of revolution, in part by subjecting them to empirical investigation in the laboratory of the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979, in order to test their validity, applicability, and explanatory power.;The proposition is that general theories of revolution are conceptually and theoretically inadequate to explain fundamental change when measured against the experience of the Iranian Revolution. They are closely associated with violence, not with revolution. Furthermore, they fail to see that Third World formations are not isolated or autonomous, but are an integral part of the world's socioeconomic system.;External linkage variables, if put in historical perspective, are extremely important analytical tools. Iran, a "weak link" in the world's chain, experienced uneven development, which generated potentially explosive structural contradictions. Yet, political dependency along with the class character of the regime further aggravated structurally determined class antagonism.;The shortcomings of the general theories highlight the need for an extremely well-developed, history-bound, and state-centered alternative theory, the world historical context model. The second proposition is that this theory is superior to the general theories of revolution. However, this approach too fails to explain the phenomenon of the Iranian Revolution. The central claim of this theory is that without the breakdown of repressive social control and without subsequent peasant rebellion, no revolution can take place. The Shah tightly controlled a modernized military institution and an extremely sophisticated secret police. He had not suffered a military defeat, nor was the international realm hostile to him. Internally, he was not extracting excessively from the peasants. Yet, in spite of a highly centralized order, the revolution occurred.;In light of these theoretical failures, a third theoretical approach is employed. The third proposition is that the Marxian theory of revolution and Marxist political thought, better explain social revolutions. They seem more compatible with the social structures and political problems of the Third World. But these formulations, too, suffer when applied to the Iranian experience, because Shi'i political culture has usually been autonomous from the established order and has challenged its domination. When placed in a historical comparative analysis, radical theories have greater explanatory ability in informing revolutionary praxis from below. (Abstract shortened with permission of author.). |
