| This dissertation examines the philosophical tenets, and the theory of personality, of Iris Murdoch's book The Sovereignty of Good. Murdoch analyzes a number of historical missteps that have led philosophers in the analytic and continental veins to adopt a theory of mind rooted in linguistic behaviorism. Murdoch rejects this position, and shows how its premises serve as the foundations of several main ethical theories. She argues that, while these theories are thought to be based upon incompatible arguments, they operate on the basis of common assumptions. She exposes a fairly ubiquitous problem in moral philosophy; many modern moral theories operate with a watered-down account of the self which yields a shallow understanding of moral problems and solutions. This problem is symptomatic of a way of thinking about the genetic fallacy identified in Wittgenstein's discussion of logical privacy. Murdoch suggests that Wittgenstein has been mis-read, and his deeper points sacrificed to persistent, classical assumptions. She seeks out core relations between moral theories, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and epistemology, claiming that modern philosophy is systematically troubled by a lack of richness, and a reductive analysis of the self.;Murdoch's illustration of a wrong-headed theory, the work of philosopher Stuart Hampshire, is examined. Murdoch's criticisms are upheld, and her central counter-example explored. Murdoch's charge that Hampshire has taken the wrong lesson from Wittgenstein is explicated, and the relation between moral theory and the idea of logical privacy further developed. Murdoch's reminder to be sensitive to the details of cases is defended, as is her effort to refocus moral theorizing more productively in terms of character rather than action. However, her metaphysical appeal to a logically and psychologically "magnetic" concept of "the good" is rejected.;Murdoch's theory of personality is then considered. Her Freudian assumptions are challenged, and a more contemporary account, based upon the ideas of narcissistic development posited by some object relations theorists, is suggested. I argue that this substitution better supports Murdoch's more cogent philosophical remarks. It also links philosophy and psychology in appropriate ways, and brings the recent progress of these disciplines to bear upon each other. |
