Linguistic competence, convention and authority: Individualism and anti-individualism in linguistics and philosophy

Two central tenets of externalist theories of word (or concept) individuation are: the claim that some terms (or concepts) derive their meaning (or content) from causal connections to the world (natural kind terms), and the claim that some terms (or concepts) derive them from intentional connections to the linguistic community (social kind terms and others). A normative conception of language underlies the latter claim (communalism). It is this conception which motivates the reliance on a principle of literal interpretation in interpreting ascriptions of intentional content.; The new theory of grammar initiated by Chomsky yields radically individualistic conceptions of language and of mind incompatible with those underlying communalist theories of conceptual content.; The feasibility of the principle of literal interpretation postulated by normativist theories depends on the possibility of identifying the language of the subject. This condition grounds an important distinction between cases of deference to science and cases of deference to communal norms. For while our shared commitments to science are a function of our sharing the same world, and thus transcend language communities, commitments to linguistic norms differ essentially across language communities.; The conception of language and concept acquisition underlying normativism leaves unexplained the facts of language change. Moreover, the problem of concept-individuation, which communalism seeks to solve by appeal to an individual's normative commitments, merely resurfaces as that of individuating linguistic communities.; Subjectivism provides an explanation of language change, as well as an important insight into the historical chain picture of the reference of names.; Moreover, the view that humans are innately endowed with concepts is problematic for an externalist theory of concept-individuation. I conclude that a relational theory of concept-individuation is inconsistent with Chomskian premises.