| This study investigated the role of global-specific attributions as mediators of cognitive deficits in depression. Sixty-four nondepressed and 64 mildly depressed college students were randomly assigned to a neutral task or to an uncontrollable failure task with either a global, a specific, or no attribution induction. All subjects then performed an anagram test task, and all attributions were measured before or after the test.;The results provided only partial support for the learned helplessness theory of depression. Depressed subjects exhibited cognitive deficits, but only after the uncontrollable failure experience. However, it was found that pretest global-specific attributions and inductions had little effect on cognitive performance. On the contrary, there was evidence that depressed exhibit more internal, stable, and global attributions than nondepressed individuals, but only as a result of two successive poor performances. Thus, it is proposed that the depressive attributional style suggested by the reformulation is not the cause of cognitive deficits but the resultant of successive negative life experiences.;Furthermore, "innoculation" with a specific attribution induction had no effect in reducing depressive cognitive deficits. Finally, depressed subjects were not found to have a rigid attributional style, but there was tentative evidence that they were more certain of internal, stable, and global attributions, whereas nondepressed persons tend toward a self-serving bias.;The generality of the reformulated helplessness theory of depression is called into doubt by this study, and the global-specific dimension does not appear to be important in mediating cognitive deficits. It is suggested that different attributional dimensions may mediate certain depressive deficits and not others. Further research should investigate these causal relationships using the present experimental design. |
