Nonanalytic judgments in depression: A cognitive investigation of depressive reasoning

Cognitive theorists have posited two types of reasoning: analytic, which is based on direct logical evaluation of information; and nonanalytic, which is based on heuristics, as for example the feeling of certainty. It was hypothesized that, due to memory and attention deficits concomitant with depression, depressed subjects would be more reliant on nonanalytic than analytic evidence, in contrast to nondepressed subjects. It was further suggested that this greater reliance on nonanalytic evidence might contribute to the tendency of depressed subjects to accept the validity of negative in contrast to positive evidence. These hypotheses were assessed in a familiarity paradigm both for impersonal information, and for personal information in the form of self-predictions. Self-report of memory and attention deficit, and the more objective memory performance parameters of accuracy/sensitivity (d...