Three essays on intertemporal fiscal closure rules and fiscal policies in macroeconomic model

This dissertation studies intertemporal fiscal closure rules and fiscal policies with both simple neoclassical overlapping-generations (OLG) models and more complex macroeconomic simulation models. Essay one studies the short-run dynamic effects and long-run steady-state implications of fiscal policies in the presence of a fiscal closure rule. With a continuous-time OLG model, it is showed that the presence of a fiscal closure rule significantly alters the short-run dynamics as well as the steady-state equilibrium of the dynamic economic system. Our study also concludes that a fiscal closure rule affects the dynamic stability and speed of convergence of an economic system.;Essay two studies the implications of alternative fiscal closure rules in macroeconomic models. A survey of alternative specifications of fiscal closure rules is conducted. The short-run dynamic effects and steady-state implications of fiscal and monetary policies under three alternative fiscal closure rules are examined in a simple OLG model. The analysis shows that both the short-run and steady-state fiscal and monetary multipliers crucially depend on the specification of fiscal closure rules. A more complex empirical macroeconomic model--an abridged two-country version of the IMF Multimod model--is introduced to supplement our studies with policy simulations. Simulations under the same three fiscal rules demonstrate that both the short-run and steady-state effects of changes in government expenditure and money supply depend on the fiscal rules used in the empirical model, and therefore validate our findings from the theoretical model.;Essay three studies debt burdens, inter-generational equity, and optimal intertemporal tax policies in an small-open-economy, neoclassical two-period OLG model. With the assumptions that inter-generational equity is the sole concern of the government and all future generations are treated equally, an optimal intertemporal tax rule is obtained in the cases of purely exhaustive government spending, government spending as public consumption, and government spending as public investment respectively. Our conclusions differs from conventional theories of optimal intertemporal taxation in which some sort of cost or efficiency loss is assumed to be associated with taxes, with the fiscal authority minimizing a loss function.