| his dissertation topic is on the market discipline of banking institutions during the most recent business cycle (i.e., the business cycle surrounding the Great Recession of 2007). Market discipline has been a focal point of banking regulation since the implementation of Basel II in June 2004. In an attempt to provide a comprehensive framework that provides international standards on bank supervision, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision designed a complementary three-pillar structure. These include: capital requirements, the supervisory review process, and market discipline. Recent research has shown that the success of capital requirement ultimately lies in how well it serves market discipline (Gordy and Howells, 2006). The FDIC defines market discipline as: The forces in a free market (without the influence of government regulation) which tend to control and limit the riskiness of a financial institution's investment and lending activities. Such forces include the concern of depositors for the safety of their deposits and the concern of bank investors for the safety and soundness of their institutions. Source: FDIC Glossary of Definitions Thus, regulators must account for market discipline in their design of a new regulatory framework.;In Chapter 1, I investigate how the yield spreads of debt issued by U.S. Systemically Important Banks (SIBs) in the secondary market are associated with their idiosyncratic risk factors, as well as bond features, and macroeconomic factors, over a complete business cycle across the pre-crisis (2003:Q1 to 2007:Q3), crisis (2007:Q4 to 2009:Q2), and post-crisis (2009:Q3 to 2014:Q3) periods. Both Global and Domestic SIBs (G-SIBs and D-SIBs) are considered. Economic theory suggests that as SIB risk-levels increase, bond-buyers demand a higher yield spread (lower price) on the debt security (Evanoff and Wall, 2000). However, explicit and implicit government safety nets before, during, and after the crisis complicate the market discipline mechanism and make a priori predictions of the yield changes in response to increases in risk inconclusive. This renders the issue an empirical exercise. By stratifying across the most recent business cycle, I am able to investigate two broad objectives. First, I study how bond-buyers react to increases in SIB risk across the recent business cycle. Second, I investigate the degree to which the proportion of the variance in yield spreads explained by macroeconomic factors changed across the phases of the cycle. Unusual volatility during and after the financial crisis in the macroeconomic realm, and the keen focus by regulators, investors, and other stakeholders on idiosyncratic risk makes it theoretically unclear which countervailing force is the primary driver of yield spreads in the secondary market.;In Chapter 2, I study the impact of bank risk taking and macroeconomic factors on the growth of interest-bearing deposits and interest rates paid on those deposits for U.S. commercial banks with less than ;In Chapter 3, I investigate the impact of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) of 2010 on accounting fees for commercial banks with less than... |
