The politics of regime reform in East European monetary and credit relations (1949-1991)

This dissertation explains outcomes of strategic bargaining to change the norms, principles and rules of regional monetary and payments arrangements in Eastern Europe from the inception of the CMEA regime though the reformulation of new market-oriented arrangements in 1989--1991. The issue being explained is the occurrence or failure of regional cooperation to change monetary and payments mechanisms in East European trade. This research addresses the questions of why the development and definition of new rules of behavior succeeded in some instances and failed in others; and what the effect of declining hegemonic leadership---and more specifically the decline of an ideological, political and economic model---was on attempts to reformulate the principles of regional trade relations.;This analysis suggests that the prevailing distribution of power within the region profoundly influenced but was not determinate of outcomes in regional strategic interaction on monetary and payments questions. Attempts to change the principles and rules of the monetary and payments regime were strongly patterned by the existence of a system of ideas---ideology---that was imposed among the subordinate states in the hegemonic system. However, because of these ideological norms, the Soviet Union could not play a role as a hegemonic leader in relation to monetary and payments relations, nor could it employ coercion to influence outcomes in regional bargaining on these issues.;Monetary and payments questions had significant explicit and implicit implications for the functioning---and stability---of the system of socialist political/economic rule in each regime member. The perceived impact of specific proposed changes to regional payments relations varied among each of the members of the hegemonic system. The persistence of such asymmetries in outcomes---where some East European states stood to potentially benefit more than others---tended to inhibit the reform of monetary arrangements both under socialist rule and in the post-1989 transitions. The research also demonstrates that regional institutions---the norms, rules, principles and decision-making procedures---served as tools to facilitate---and also to inhibit---regional cooperation on monetary and settlements questions.