| This dissertation consists of two parts, the first focusing on scientific productivity, the other on art market institutions. Part I compares the life cycle productivity and influence of Nobel laureates with those of other academic economists. The following findings are presented: (1) Nobel laureates exhibit a flatter productivity profile. They publish an average of almost three times more and maintain above-average levels of productivity for longer. (2) The publication influence of Nobel winners increases with age, while that of other economists decreases. Laureates publish papers of higher-impact and, for a decade longer, of above-average influence. Finally, chapter 1 finds that winning the Nobel Prize does not affect citations to laureates' works, suggesting that it may merely reinforce their professional reputation.; Chapter 2 begins the exploration into art by examining the transition of marketing practices in the late 19th century Parisian art market. This chapter provides the historical background necessary to understand the prominence, growth, and decline of the Salon, the state annual art exhibition. It attributes its prominence to royal support, its growth to economic expansion, and its decline to entry by dealer-owned art galleries.; Chapter 3 empirically measures the decline in the Salon's certification ability as represented by the price ratio of Salon to non-Salon paintings. The results show that the Salon attained its greatest influence over market prices at mid-century; however, its premium steadily diminished until disappearing in the 1880s. This decline coincides with the rise of a decentralized dealer system.; Finally, chapter 4 explores the effects of reputation on contracting practices in the contemporary art market. It examines a hold-up problem in dealer-artist relationships. Once the dealer has sunk resources into finding a potential buyer, the artist and buyer have an incentive to bypass the dealer and bargain on their own. This hold-up is inefficient as it lowers dealer effort and forces the artist to engage in self-promotion. The analysis establishes two possible mechanisms for overcoming the commitment problem: bilateral and multilateral punishment mechanisms. In general, a multilateral mechanism overcomes the commitment problem at a lower cost; however, it requires more information-sharing among participants. |
