Economic determinants of accounting discretion: Empirical evidence from Spain (Spanish text)

In this investigation we analyse the economic determinants of the accounting choice in Spanish listed firms during the last decade. We have studied the contractual nature of the exercise of accounting discretion through the analysis of the incentives and restriction to managerial discretion arising from the ownership and governance structure, debt financing and the investment opportunity set. The sample, all quoted firms, and the proxy used for the accounting discretion, discretionary accruals, make this investigation general in character, that is, we are not focusing on a particular sample where we particularly expect specific managerial behaviour nor on a particular accounting method.; The dynamic empirical model has been estimated by applying the econometrics of panel data to a sample of 784 observations, belonging to 109 firms during the period 1991--1999. The results obtained reveal how debt financing and the existence of growth opportunities generate incentives for higher accounting discretion. The board of directors is an important determinant of accounting discretion, its size and director ownership being characteristics on which this body accomplishes its monitoring functions. Empirical evidence is also provided for the negative relation between absolute discretionary accruals and ownership concentration. The group the largest shareholder belongs to are also relevant in the exercise of accounting discretion by managers.; This investigation is important for several reasons. Firstly, it contributes to the earnings management and corporate governance literature by providing additional evidence consistent with the important role played by the board of directors and ownership concentration in governing earnings management in a continental Europe country with important differences in accounting rules and corporate governance compared to the Anglo-Saxon countries. Secondly, debt financing and growth opportunities have been considered along with ownership structure, also being relevant in accounting discretion. Thirdly, the significance of the lagged dependent variable, in this case, the discretionary accruals, reveals the need to consider discretionary accrual inertia when researchers use a cross sectional accrual model to measure the exercise of accounting discretion. And finally, this investigation invites us to think about the consideration of accounting information as an integral part of corporate governance.