| This dissertation investigates the problem of how European governments were able to relinquish sovereignty over monetary policy, despite significant differences in views about its conduct, and eventually reach agreement on the framework of a single European currency. Through extensive interviews with Europe's central bankers, and research of available secondary sources, the dissertation defines an institutional epistemic community (IEC), asserts that the community of central bankers fulfills the definition of this IEC, and explains how and why it developed, and lastly, documents its impact.; The dissertation finds that the agreement reached at Maastricht (the European Economic and Monetary Union, or EMU) was made possible by the presence of the IEC of central bankers, who were the national experts on monetary policy. The IEC's credibility and expertise made it possible for the governments to relinquish their jurisdiction over monetary policy to the IEC. The dissertation's findings suggest that the substance, or content, of other sorts of international accords, not just the one reached at Maastricht, can be agreed upon by communities of experts that develop over time. |
