| This dissertation analyzes two import protection programs in the U.S. The first are the antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) laws, and the second are Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs). Chapter II is the first attempt in the literature to analyze U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) decision making on “sunset reviews” of AD cases. I begin by discussing the fact that sunset cases require commissioners to account for the distorting effects of dumping protection as well as competitive forces on industry conditions. I then empirically test whether ITC decision-making adheres more closely to congressionally-mandated economic criterion or political considerations. Results indicate that ITC determinations are based substantially on the legal framework for sunset reviews. However, there is also evidence that Chinese competitors and poorer nations in general face a negative bias at the ITC. Results also reveal that favorable treatment is received by U.S. industries that are: (a) more concentrated, (b) pay higher wages, (c) steel producers, and (d) located in voting districts of Senate and House oversight committee members.; In Chapters III and IV of the dissertation, I analyze how AD/CVD policy and VERB have impacted the price-cost markup in the steel industry. I first develop a leader-follower model that encompasses total U.S. market demand, import supply, and domestic pricing determinations. Three-stage non-linear least squares results from Chapter III indicate that the initial phase of the VER implemented by President Reagan allowed gross price-cost margins to rise by 8.4 percent. In contrast, there is no evidence that the VER extension under President Bush, nor the subsequent period dominated by AD duties, caused the markup to rise in comparison to the relatively unprotected 1980–1984 period.; In Chapter IV, I use disaggregated steel data that allow me to control for variation in several key variables, including the level of quota or AD/CVD protection and the degree of production involving more efficient “minimill” facilities. Markup calculations reveal a pattern that is consistent with results from the previous essay, whereby price-cost margins rise dramatically during the initial phase of the VER, and then decline during both the VER extension and the subsequent “antidumping” period. |
