| Two experiments tested the predictions of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, 1984), the predictions of equity theory (Adams, 1965) and the influence of self-construal (Singelis, 1994) in the realm of social dilemmas. Results from previous research involving prospect theory and social dilemmas have been inconsistent. In the first experiment (n = 320), game structure (give-some or refrain-from taking game), age of the public resource and the diminished/grown nature of the public resource were manipulated (in a completely crossed 2 x 2 x 2 design), while self-construal was included as a covariate. The results provided partial support for the theoretical predictions of prospect theory. In experiment 2 (n = 204), game structure and equity perceptions were manipulated (in a completely crossed 2 x 3 design). The results provided partial support for the theoretical predictions. The qualitative results suggest that obedience to authority, concern for others, and guilt were more important than game structure, age of the resource, the diminished/grown nature of the resource and equity perceptions in determining cooperation in social dilemmas. Further, the results suggest that loss aversion in social dilemmas is more complex than that described by prospect theory. Specifically, loss aversion is dualistic in nature: it can occur toward both self-owned resources and publicly-owned resources. Methodological problems are noted and suggestions for future research are presented. |
