Holding executives accountable for delegated legislation: Selected cases in Canadian environmental assessment practic

Holding executives accountable for how they exercise discretionary authority is a particularly difficult task in Westminster-based parliamentary systems. The principle of cabinet government, and the practice of party solidarity, effectively fuses the executive and legislative functions. This fusion permits the passage of legislation which grants executive decision-makers almost unbounded discretion in the policy implementation process. As illustrated in this dissertation, parliamentary executives use this discretion to vary--and at times even undermine--the spirit and intent of legislation. Furthermore, because this legislation seldom spells out how discretion should be exercised, it is extemely difficult to hold parliamentary executives accountable for any abuse of discretion which may occur.;Part One of this dissertation examines the difficulties involved in holding Canadian executives accountable for the exercise of discretionary authority in the realm of environmental policy. Relying upon the histories of four large scale natural resource development projects, Part One shows how the two primary avenues for holding executives accountable--the courts and legislative scrutiny committees--can be undermined by ambiguity within parent legislation. Part Two of this dissertation examines the prospects for improving executive accountability in Canada. Part Two argues that the first step toward reforming executive accountability--the passage of discretion-constricting legislation--can be taken when an executive believes that such legislation is in its political interest.