| This dissertation aims at elucidating which theoretical conceptions of international politics and foreign policy making on the part of states are most useful in explaining post-unification German foreign policy. It distiguishes between three broad models of international politics--(1) neorealism, (2) weak liberalism (normalization) and (3) strong liberalism (liberal internationalism, civilian power approach).;After unification, the international debate was heavily influenced by neorealist perceptions, which saw Germany as a rising power and a challenger of the status quo. In the German domestic debate, on the other hand, liberal internationalist notions of foreign policy prevailed. A significant minority of international and German analysts subscribed to weak neoliberal concepts.;It is shown that post-unification German foreign policy can be explained best by Germany's identity as a civilian power. However, between 1988 and 1995, the applicability of weak neoliberal hypotheses has increased, while internationalist concepts have become less useful. Germany has become more similar to other Western nations, a process that can be termed "normalization".;Ironically, this adjustment was partially caused by Germany's special identity as a civilian power. It is likely to be a singular process, allowing for a better alignment of Germany's commitments and resources and the safeguarding of the core of Germany's "civilian" preferences. A further "normalization" in the direction of neorealist predictions is unlikely.;The concluding chapter identifies five potential German grand strategies: (1) Internationalism (strong liberalism, civilian power), (2) pragmatic multilateralism (weak liberalism, "as-well"), (3) Europeanism (deepening, Carolingian completion), (4) wider Europe (Euroskepticism, mild realism), (5) world power (or traditional geopolitics). It is shown that world power strategies are not a serious option. Moreover, internationalist as well as strongly Europeanist strategies have become less likely.;This leaves as likely alternatives the "pragmatic multilateralist" and the "wider Europe" options. Both continue Germany's multilateral orientation. They differ in the way Germany's global responsibilities are defined (a slightly more encompassing view among the pragmatic multilateralists), how clearly national interests can be based on geostrategy and national identity (slightly more pronounced for proponents of wider Europe), and the relative weight assigned to all-European versus transatlantic and global institutions. |
