| This dissertation examines whether practitioners perceive that performance budget reform, as implemented in the states, increases the discretion of administrators affording them greater flexibility with which to achieve program goals. The theoretical bases for questioning this expectation of reform are grounded in the literature of accountability and budgeting. It was proposed that performance budget reform may not realize change in the manner prescriptive theory envisions to the extent that: (1) reform does not bring about expected changes in bureaucratic and political accountability demands and (2) legal accountability claims and fiscal constraints, which are beyond the scope of this reform, affect discretion in budgeting.; The study employs a cross-sectional design conducted in two phases. All fifty state budget offices were first surveyed to determine the status of reform initiatives as of July 1996. A nationwide survey of administrators and central budget staff in the program areas of Corrections, Education K-12, and Revenue was then conducted. Their assessment of performance budget reform and its relationship to accountability and discretion provided data to empirically test the fit between reform expectations and reform outcomes as viewed by practitioners.; Findings indicated that respondents in these program areas did not perceive bureaucratic constraints were streamlined by reform efforts no matter how advanced their state was in implementing performance budgeting. To the contrary, reform was perceived to add to these constraints. Findings also underscored the importance of political accountability demands and lend support to the position that increased administrative discretion in fund management and a shift in politicians' oversight focus toward program outcomes may not occur in the short term.; Results, furthermore, indicated a need to differentiate among programs that have distinct legal claims on appropriations. A notable finding is the degree that legal claims and fiscal constraints are perceived to restrict budget decisions. Respondents, on average, perceived no more than thirty percent of their Fiscal Year 1997 operating budget was discretionary; that is, not determined by multiyear funding decisions, mandates from other levels or branches of government, compulsory adjustments, or ties to specific revenue sources. |
