Breaking the silence: Japan's behaviors in the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds of the GATT

This dissertation develops new definitions for identifying states' negotiating behavior and applies these definitions to the case of Japan in the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds of the GATT. It is argued that since the end of World War II, Japanese trade negotiators typically have behaved in a minimalist fashion by exhibiting passive, reactive, and acquiescent behavior. Over the last fifteen years, however, cases of Japanese assertiveness---proactive, persuasive, and defiant behavior---in international economic negotiations have been increasing. In contrast to previous studies of Japanese negotiating behavior, which have tended to focus on either Japanese minimalism or assertiveness, but not both, this dissertation constructs a framework for explaining the full range of Japan's behavior.; Japanese negotiating behavior, it is argued, depends primarily on the degree to which the industry involved in the negotiation is integrated into the global economy. For highly internationalized industries Japanese negotiators will be capable of behaving proactively, persuasively, and/or defiantly. For parochial industries, Japanese diplomats will find themselves hard-pressed to break from the typical passive-reactive-acquiescent script.; Japanese economic diplomacy also is a function of the level of American pressure (gaiatsu). For parochial sectors, intense pressure from Washington tends to induce a reactive and ultimately acquiescent Japanese response. For highly internationalized industries, however, Japan's response to U.S. pressure is less predictable. This is because interest group preferences and foreign pressure are channeled through an intervening variable, the decision-making process of the Japanese state. When Japanese decision-makers are divided, passive, reactive, and acquiescent behavior will be the result. Relatively unified decision-makers, in contrast, are capable of diplomatic assertiveness. Furthermore, the dissertation argues that paralyzing divisions are most likely to arise in negotiations involving parochial industries.; In selected negotiations of the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds, the dissertation's mixed-level framework explains Japanese behavior nicely. Japan's passive, reactive, and ultimately acquiescent performance in the Tokyo Round tariff and Uruguay Round agriculture talks can be explained by interest group parochialism, intense American pressure, and deep divisions among Japanese decision-makers. In contrast, Japanese assertiveness in the Uruguay Round anti-dumping talks was possible because of the internationalization of the electronics industry, the relatively low level of U.S. pressure, and unity among Japanese policymakers.