Checks and balances: Partisan politics and judicial power

The dissertation integrates the studies of legislative and judicial politics into a single theory, with the goal of evaluating how party politics has affected the historical development of the legal process. I use sequential game theory and spatial modeling to analyze the relationship between the Supreme Court, lower federal courts and the elected branches, in which each political actor attempts to influence legal doctrine. My focus is on the conditions under which Congress and the president engage in what I call "judicial deckstacking," which entails their strategic use their powers over the judicial branch's structure and procedure, and over federal judgeships. Judicial appointments have a strongly partisan flavor, and I also demonstrate that vacancies on the federal bench are prolonged when different parties control the presidency and the majority in the Senate than when control of these branches is unified. Second, statutory expansions of the lower federal courts are significantly more likely to occur when a single party has a monopoly on the legislative process. Third, statutory expansions in federal jurisdiction and the Supreme Court's discretion occur only when a single party has a monopoly on the legislative process, and are increasingly likely when the Supreme Court's partisan balance is more favorable to the dominant legislative party. I conclude that we can best understand the judicial branch's evolution as the result of partisan battles for political advantage. Moreover, given the role that the federal judicial branch plays in implementing federal laws, I argue that to understand the effectiveness of federal lawmaking, we must understand the conditions under which the elected branches delegate increased powers to federal courts. My evidence suggests that a new understanding of unified government---one that takes into account the courts' partisanship---may be needed.