| President Bush encountered a rhetorical problem unique to the late 20th century in attempting to garner support for the conflict in the Gulf: the Cold War had ended. Traditional reflexive definitions that had served America well for the forty years preceding the Gulf conflict could no longer be called into service. America was not in the Gulf to contain Communist aggression or to do battle against the Soviet Union. Bush had to find a way of justifying war in a post-Cold War world.;This study examines Bush's Gulf War rhetoric, and provides close analysis of eight major addresses and two major press conference opening statements that occurred during the Gulf conflict.;In this study, I address following questions: (1) What was form and substance of presidential discourse of war in this first war of the post-Cold War era? (2) What transformations did the the rhetoric undergo over the course of the war? and (3) What is the paradigm George Bush began to put in place for presidential war rhetoric in the post-Cold War world?;The study finds that Bush's rhetorical path through the Gulf War was ultimately one of subtle transformation with the appearance of surface consistency. Under the guise of four constant war objectives, Bush transformed the struggle from one of the supposed defense of Saudi Arabia to an outright attack on the nuclear installations of Iraq itself. Using historical analogy, narrative, civil religion and definition, Bush created a political reality that included not just nationalistic pride, but an almost religious devotion. America came out of the Gulf conflict redeemed from the loss of Vietnam and the errors of World War II. America took on the devil, and came through the time of testing victorious. In the Gulf War, familiar Cold War appeals to the Munich analogy and to the need to eliminate rhetorical Hitleresque devils, along with appeals for containment (in that Hussein must be contained within his borders) were presented as justifications for American involvement. The central goal of the Cold War may have been lost, but the basic Cold War arguments remained. |
