State and market in rural south China: The political economy of the village in the reform era

This is an ethnographic study of rural conditions in the Pearl River Delta in the post-Mao reform era. It asks how the organization of power at the grass-roots level in rural China has developed during a period of rapid economic reform and development, and how the configuration has shaped the reform and development process in return. The study asserts that the coexistence of political centralism and a market economy leads to the resurgence of what Duara calls state involution.; In the reform era, the central state continues to vest great power in local cadres to carry out basic policies but fails to extend full bureaucratic control over them. Cadres can take advantage of their power in the circumstances of a thriving market economy by turning their political and administrative power into personal profits. At the same time, the lure of such profits provides incentives for cadres to enforce the state's policies (e.g. to enforce birth control regulations, combat religious activities, recruit for the army, etc.) in a rather loyal manner.; However, the cadres' profiteering activities are often conducted at the expense of the local populace. They also lead to collusion between the cadres and entrepreneurs. The cadre-entrepreneur alliance has resulted in a more rapid differentiation in wealth and social status among the populace. The so-called "socialism with Chinese characteristics" is, in practice, a more oppressive version of early capitalism in the region. Social discontent with cadres' corruption is widespread. However, due to the villagers' general acceptance of capitalist ideology and their amoral familism and lack of organization, the current status quo has not been threatened by any social force.