Autonomy, subsidiarity and the religious university

The purpose of this dissertation is to develop an alternative understanding of the concept of academic freedom based on the principle of subsidiarity. The current understanding of academic freedom is essentially individualistic. This understanding causes insoluble difficulties for religiously affiliated institutions of higher learning. The emphasis on individual autonomy in individualism would appear to require that religious institutions of higher learning must limit their religious commitments to minimize the risk of limiting the academic freedom of individuals. My first chapter illustrates this difficulty through examples such as the dispute at Catholic University of America over the case of Charles Curran. Such examples demonstrate the need for an alternative understanding of academic freedom that is better suited to religious institutions of higher learning.; The second chapter examines two theories of individualism, those of Mill and Nozick. Mill's On Liberty is a 19th century defense of individual freedom against coercive authority, while Nozick's Anarchy State and Utopia represents a contemporary attempt to defend individual rights against state authority. The current understanding of academic freedom has its roots in these kinds of individualism. In chapter three, I argue that these theories are subject to severe criticism.; Chapter four examines the principle of subsidiarity from the 1931 papal encyclical Quadragesimo Anno. In the chapter, I develop three standards for implementing the principle based on its statement in QA. A fourth standard is then added based on further developments with the principle in contemporary thought. Chapter five argues that, since subsidiarity avoids the problems to which individualism is subject, it represents a superior understanding of the relationship between individual autonomy and authority.; The final two chapters develop an understanding of academic freedom based on the standards for implementing the principle of subsidiarity. These chapters show that this understanding allows religious institutions of higher learning to address problems related to academic freedom better than the contemporary individualistic understanding of academic freedom.