| This dissertation considers the origins, implementation, and impact of United States development programs in Chile during the 1960s. Using documents collected at the National Archives, the Johnson and Kennedy Libraries, and various sources in Chile, this study argues that throughout the 1960s, the United States government saw foreign aid as a means of exerting influence over Latin American political processes. During this period, the US sent aid to Latin America as part of the Alliance for Progress, a program dedicated to stopping the spread of communism through long-term economic growth. In the early 1960s Chile became a priority for the program as a country facing a significant electoral threat from local Marxists. However, rather than commit money to promote long-term economic growth, the US supported aid programs designed to ensure that moderate politicians won the 1964 presidential elections. Following the election of Eduardo Frei to the Chilean presidency, the US continued to view Chile as a high priority, but used aid money as a lever to force political and economic concessions. By the late-1960s, because of Frei's political success and a sense that Chile was stable, the United States pulled back from an active funding program. By the end of the 1960s, the distractions of the Vietnam War and the transfer of power from Johnson to Nixon made a consistent and well-thought-out approach impossible. Ultimately, US aid programs under the Alliance for Progress did not bring economic progress to Chile. In addition, development assistance had a limited effect on the strength of Marxist parties as Salvador Allende won the 1970 presidential election. |
