| This dissertation proposed a model relating culture to self-interested behavior in resource negotiations. Participants from four economic regions---North America, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia---made resource allocation decisions prior to a discussion in culturally mixed groups. Cultural differences were confirmed along two cultural values that shape implicit theories invoked in negotiations, self-direction and hierarchy. Results, based on an experimental commons dilemma simulation, supported a contextual model in which culture interacts with economic power asymmetry. Decision-makers from groups that scored high on the cultural value of hierarchy reacted to economic power cues, whereas, those low on hierarchy did not. Decision-makers from hierarchical groups that also scored high on the cultural value of self-direction were more self-interested in positions of high economic power, and relatively less so in positions of low economic power, suggesting they applied an equity norm. In contrast, decision-makers from groups high on hierarchy and low on self-direction were less self-interested and more socially responsible (cooperative) in positions of high economic power, suggesting they applied an inverse equity norm. Results also indicated that the interaction effect of cultural profile and economic power on self-interested behavior was fully mediated by social motives, egocentrism, and expectations. Implications for the impact of culture on social dilemmas are discussed. |
