A funny thing happened on the way to the market: The Supreme Court and freedom of speech in the electoral process

In this dissertation I explore the nature and process of the United States Supreme Court's understanding of freedom of speech in the electoral process. Given the constitutive effects of this understanding---or the way in which the Court's conclusions structure the organization and operation of the electoral process---it is essential that we appreciate both the essence and method of the justices' approach to free speech issues during political campaigns and elections.; To explore and evaluate the Court's understanding, I employ two primary methods: an analysis of the reasoning and rhetoric expressed in the thirty-five U.S. Supreme Court cases (ranging from 1947 to 2002) that involve state restrictions on various forms of "speech" within the electoral process, and elite interviews with the individuals involved in four recent electoral speech controversies. These case studies---chosen from, and representative of the larger body of thirty-five---provide in-depth explorations of Burson v. Freeman (1992), McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission (1995), Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc. (1999), and Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Govt. PAC (2000).; I find that the nature of the Court's understanding of electoral speech can be explained by reference to multiple conceptions of the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor---the dominant trope in free expression jurisprudence---with each conception embracing a different core philosophical value (Liberty, Equality, or Civility). In terms of the process of the Court's understanding, I find that the justices arrive at and articulate their understanding by reference to four factors beyond the law: appeals to historic principles and practice; the employment of data and social science evidence; and both "idealistic assumptions" and "realistic concessions" regarding human nature and the operation of the electoral process. Further, as the interviews demonstrate, those responsible for bringing, ushering, hearing, and arguing the case in courts below provide what I call "constituent contribution" to constitutional meaning, in that their "framing" of the case and controversy facilitates the evolution of the marketplace concept. Finally, my research complicates our conventional understanding of "liberal" and "conservative" approaches to freedom of speech, and it urges a reconsideration of the Court's role in reviewing such cases.