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Fictional objects

Posted on:1997-02-19Degree:Ph.DType:Dissertation
University:University of Waterloo (Canada)Candidate:Koehn, Glen RFull Text:PDF
GTID:1465390014981337Subject:Philosophy
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The dissertation explores certain puzzles about fiction and existence. Some historical discussion of Brentano, Meinong and Russell sets the stage for an extended account of three neo-Meinongian semantic theories: those of Terence Parsons, Richard Routley (Sylvan), and Edward Zalta. It is argued that these authors rely on a false understanding of fiction. A distinction between setting out linguistic precedents in storytelling and following such precedents helps allow for the notion of being true in a story. However, fictional truth is not a special case of truth nor is there any set of objects called 'fictional objects'.
Keywords/Search Tags:Fiction
PDF Full Text Request
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