Conflicts of principle in Samuel Johnson's literary criticism

For many years critics have disagreed about the nature of Samuel Johnson's literary criticism. Some have maintained that Johnson based his critical judgments on principles; others have claimed that Johnson rejected principles in favor of sensibility and spontaneity. In this dissertation I argue that Johnson based many of his critical judgments on a handful of fundamental principles, but I focus on the conflicts that spring up among these principles. I look at what happens when a particular literary work satisfies one of Johnson's principles at the expense of another.;In Chapter 1 I distinguish between rules and principles and introduce Johnson's fundamental principles: instruction, pleasure, and mimesis .;Chapter 2 examines tensions between instruction and pleasure in Johnson's criticism. In the first half of the chapter I look at a number of works that Johnson judged more pleasing than instructive, including classical poems, Shakespeare plays, and Restoration dramas. In the second half I look at works that Johnson deemed more instructive than pleasurable, with special emphasis on Prior's Solomon and Milton's Paradise Lost. I argue that Johnson was not automatically pleased with works that affirmed his own worldview.;Chapter 3 examines conflicts between imitation and pleasure. In the first half of the chapter I look at Johnson's theories about why certain imitations gradually lose their ability to please. I pay particular attention to Johnson's praise of Shakespeare as a "poet of nature" and his criticisms of Butler, Fielding, and Sterne as "poets of manners." In the second half of the chapter I explore the contradictions in Johnson's thinking about non-mimetic fictions. I anatomize Johnson's love-hate relationship with the romance and his distinctive reading of Don Quixote.;Chapter 4 looks at two conflicts between imitation and instruction: mixed characters and poetic justice. I argue that Johnson's views on mixed characters were more moderate than they are generally assumed to be, and I present a revisionist interpretation of Johnson's seemingly contradictory comments on poetic justice.;Chapter 5 draws some conclusions about Johnson's strengths and weaknesses as a critic, with particular reference to his comments on Milton's Lycidas.