The sociology of reductionism: A case study of the 'Neuroscience Explosion'

This study addresses the problem of reductionism in science from a sociological perspective. In simplest form, reductionism refers to understanding certain ontological domains by reference to other domains. As an intellectual topic of inquiry reductionism has typically been discussed among philosophers, and has been conceived as a problem of logical relations within an essentialistic ontological hierarchy. However, philosophical argumentation has not formulated a solution to the problem, and is unlikely to do so. This study conceptualizes the problem of reductionism as form of professional competition over domains of expertise. It is a process of professional boundary expansion, typically marked by the formation of a new scientific specialty, and driven by opportunities for professional recognition. A general model of specialty dynamics is developed and applied to the twentieth century growth of neuroscience. Recognition of the role of the brain in human behavior is at least 5,000 years old, and the roots of modern neuroscience were laid by about 1850. Yet it was not until around 1960 that "Neuroscience" appeared and experienced dramatic growth. The so-called "neuroscience explosion" is traced to three major developments which had to do, not with solving logical problems about ontological domains, but with changing patterns of communication and practice among researchers from different professional domains. These developments are: (1) the rise of electroencephalography as the first "brain imaging" device which unified and standardized a great deal of research across a number of settings; (2) the Neurosciences Research Program, a novel form of academic organization that served to focus and coordinate communications across a large number of domains; and (3) a post-World War II boom in the availability of resources for health (including mental health) research. The reductionist "mind-brain" equation is coming about, not through solving logical quandaries relating to ontology and epistemology, but through changes in the social organization of knowledge production as it occurs in actual practice. If reductionism is to be understood, it is to be understood as a variable---something that either happens or doesn't happen depending upon the activities of scientific professionals. The sociology of science already holds the tools necessary to a good understanding of the process.