When your enemy hungers: The Kennedy administration, public opinion, and the famine in China, 1961--1962

In late 1960, as President-elect John F. Kennedy prepared to take office, the People's Republic of China suffered in the throes of a terrible famine which resulted from the failed Great Leap Forward campaign. Although the exact scope of this disaster (which claimed some thirty million lives) is still not entirely known, media and intelligence sources began to disseminate news of widespread suffering on the mainland through a variety of channels in early 1961. This study attempts to analyze the ways that the American public and policymakers responded to the crisis.; Given the considerable obstacles involved in assessing the scope of the famine, the American media conveyed an accurate sense of the suffering on the mainland. Based on editorials in major newspapers and magazine, polls, and the efforts of various national and grassroots organizations, the public responded willingly to an overture of American food for the Chinese people. Judging from the reaction the famine received in scholarly journals, China experts were more skeptical regarding its significance.; Through the fortuitous acquisition of a series of secret Chinese documents, the Kennedy administration had a much better picture of the crisis on the mainland than did the general public or China experts. More fearful of a Congressional (rather than public) backlash, the Kennedy administration remained open to an overture, and made delicate attempts to probe Chinese willingness to accept American food. These attempts were later publicly rebuffed by the Chinese; the outbreak of hostilities with India in October 1962 ended administration interest in moderation toward Beijing.; In contrast to earlier scholarship, this study reveals that the administration took the crisis seriously and made several careful attempts to extend a moderate overture to Beijing. Policymakers did not fear a negative public reaction from such a move; instead, they believed a food overture would find support in a tradition of American humanitarianism. Still, a number of other factors made the administration understandably cautious. An unequivocal rejection from Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi in May 1962 finally shelved the question of food for China.