A complicated business: The Pentagon Talks, 1947: A case study in Anglo-American cooperation in the early Cold War

This dissertation investigates the nature of the relationship between Britain and the United States in the early postwar years. Specifically, it seeks to answer the question of who controlled whom in the relationship by examining the Pentagon Talks as a case study in cooperation. The Pentagon Talks were a series of meetings in October--November, 1947, between civilian and military officials of each side. The talks resulted in the adoption by Britain and the U.S. of parallel policies towards the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.; The dissertation argues that the Anglo-American special relationship was a largely mythical creature, constructed by Britain in an attempt to convince the U.S. that British/U.S. interests in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean were identical. The special relationship was a diplomatic tool employed by Britain as a way of preserving its Empire/Commonwealth in the face of a perceived threat from the Soviet Union. The dissertation further argues that U.S. policymakers did not fall prey to British claims for a special relationship, and acted to maintain the British Empire/Commonwealth on the basis of U.S. interests.; The dissertation thus takes issue with the traditional interpretation of the Labour government's foreign policy which perceives Britain as being prepared to negotiate with the Soviet Union until early 1947, seeking U.S. support only when Soviet actions made negotiation impossible. My dissertation argues instead that the British Foreign Office launched a deliberate campaign designed to preserve the Empire/Commonwealth and Britain's position at its core; U.S. policymakers decided to support this attempt in the Pentagon Talks not on the basis of a special relationship but because it suited their political and strategic interests.