Beyond a rational choice sociology: A sociology of rationality

It is argued that Rational Choice Theory (RCT) is an insufficient and inappropriate foundation for a comprehensive and universal theory of the social world. The theory makes assumptions about the individual human actor which are empirically unfounded and unsupportable. It is demonstrated that individuals are not the purposive, informed, knowledgeable, calculating, materialist, self-interested, and maximizing (single-minded, amoral, and insatiable) actors that the theory requires and explains. Efforts to overcome these assumptional shortcomings and to extend and generalize the theory to the whole of social life have made the theory circular, unscientific, and of little use. The willingness of advocates to sacrifice scientific validity to universality is discussed as a topic of sociological interest in its own right. It is argued that rationality makes a much better dependent variable to be explained than independent variable to explain with, a better outcome than assumption. From such a perspective, we see that rationality is a product of certain social structures. More specifically, it is an emergent property of loosely-coupled group actors, or ‘organizations’, and to a lesser extent, of loosely-coupled societies in general. Unlike other social actors—individuals and tightly-coupled ‘tribes’—organizations are purposive, informed, calculating, and self-maximizing in the ways that rationality, as understood by RCT, requires and assumes. The means by which organizational rationality emerges from the irrationality of their individual components are detailed. The sociological implications of the argument are discussed, as well as public policy applications derived from it.