Dispositions and persons in the ontologies of Vasubandhu and Richard Swinburne

This dissertation examines the conceptual problems that arise when accounting for the continuity and causal efficacy of mental events within different ontological frameworks. The examination hinges on two contentions: first, that certain types of properties must last through a certain amount of time if they are to exercise causal efficacy, and that in the absence of these properties' exercise of causal efficacy, human persons cannot think or act. These properties are dispositional properties, i.e. those that can last through time even when one is unaware of them; they include properties of belief, desire, and memory. The second contention is that the fact of a dispositional property's having continuity and causal efficacy necessarily implies a particular ontology. In order to try to distinguish the problem of the analysis of a dispositional property from the problem of how this concept relates to the ontological system in which it functions, an effort is made to construct a definition of dispositional property that is neutral in the sense that it does not explicitly include a commitment to the existence of substantial entities or a lack thereof.; The method of the study is that of examining and comparing the event-ontological account of Vasubandhu, a Gupta period Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist, as presented in various texts written originally in Sanskrit, and the substance-dualist account of Richard Swinburne, a contemporary English philosopher of religion, as presented in The Evolution of the Soul. The first three chapters trace the logical framework and development of conceptual problems related to the continuity and causal efficacy of dispositional properties in the Abhidharmakośabhās&dotbelow;ya. The fourth and fifth chapters examine a second body of texts attributed to Vasubandhu; the conceptual framework of these texts logically presupposes and makes use of several of the concepts utilized by the Abhidharmakośabhās&dotbelow;ya , but develops them in ways that lead to different conclusions. The sixth chapter then turns to the substance-dualist account of Richard Swinburne. The final chapter outlines the conclusions with which these accounts leave us with respect to the nature of existent entities, as well as the merits of approaching philosophical questions from a comparative perspective.