| In the wake of the three hegemonic wars of the past two hundred years--the Napoleonic wars, World War I, and World War II--statesmen proclaimed new world orders in which stability, the absence of major wars and crises, would be maintained and enforced by cooperative security arrangements, concerts and collective security systems. These expectations were not fulfilled, however, because these security arrangements quickly failed. The central question of this study is whether great powers can defend themselves and their interests through cooperative approaches to security that are based on norms or enlightened self-interest, cooperating in the short run to maximize self-interest in the long run, rather than relying on the balance of power which requires them to maximize their immediate self-interest.;The central argument of this study is that great powers cannot submit to the requirements of collective security or concert systems because they cannot forsake their security interests, protection of the state itself and its vital interests, for three reasons predicted by the realist theory of international politics. To protect their security interests great powers must behave in a fearful manner because they want to survive but are uncertain about the intentions of other states. Second, they are compelled to act in a self-help manner. Great powers will do what they can to guarantee their own survival in an anarchic international system where no other state is certain to assist them in time of peril. Third, great powers maximize their relative offensive power to be as secure as possible in a dangerous world. Behaving in a self-interested manner to protect their security interests, great powers are not able to abide by norms or enlightened self-interest, so they cannot form a collective security or concert system that is viable. Great powers are thus condemned to depend on the balance of power for stability. |
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