| Controversies in environmental politics often reflect concerns about whether the common good is properly handled by the governance apparatus. Similarly, scholars and commentators looking at democratic accountability wonder how well representative democracies translate the public will into public policy. In such previous examinations of the ties between constituencies and representatives, it has been shown that the strength of the opinion-policy connection varies across time, polity, and policy domain. This study addresses the question of how closely and consistently public opinion and public policy are linked in the key issue domain of environmental policy. It is but one facet of the above question about whether government serves the common good: How responsive is environmental policy to what the public perceives to be “good,” or “enough” environmental policy?; The empirical evidence was gathered by analyzing environmental opinion and policy over a period of 21 years for U.S. senators. Two different accountability mechanisms of representation were evaluated: real-time responsiveness and electoral turnover. In the baseline assessment, a general dyadic model confirmed that—as a rule—senators are more responsive to electoral pressures than to ongoing changes in constituency opinion. However, what is true for the “whole” policy spectrum is not the case for the environmental “part.” When senators vote on environmental policies, representation is direct and intense—with little note to election proximity.; In the core analysis I employ econometric models that consistently demonstrate statistically significant relationships between support for environmental policy (opinion) and environmental policy. The dependent variable is environmental voting, measured using custom-scaled LCV scores (League of Conservation Voters). Measures of constituency opinion are constructed by combining time and cross-sectional surveys. Subsequently, secondary analyses of state-level effects and residuals provide insight to contextual effects, complying with expectations given in reports by Erikson, Wright and McIver. Last, incorporating measures of pollution in the model verifies that representation at the national level is strongly driven by the actual pollution threat located in a senator's state.; In the final analysis, the study seeks to integrate the findings of direct democratic accountability with the specifics of environmental politics.; I also assess questions of over-responsiveness and system stability. Is this hyper-vigilant attention by representatives a threat to governance stability? (Abstract shortened by UMI.)... |
