Emerging cooperation under power, preference, and region

This dissertation examines the relationship between international cooperation and structural constraints by extending the argument of power transition theory, which is the theory of war. While power transition theory explains the dynamics of great power war by employing two structural constraints---relative power distribution and preference over the dyadic status quo---few attempts have analyzed the international cooperation based on these structural constraints among the research in power transition theory.; This dissertation fills this gap by deriving propositions from the power transition theory and by empirically testing these propositions. Although previous empirical analysis of cooperation in power transition theory focuses on the dynamic aspect of nations' behavior, the analysis presented in this dissertation examines the general pattern of interstate behavior constrained by the combinations of two structural factors.; The empirical results of multilevel model analysis suggest that interstate interactions are observed as expected from the derivation of propositions from power transition theory. The preference over the dyadic status quo has strong influence over the cooperative interactions, as power transition theory had expected. Likewise, relative power distribution also has a significant impact on the cooperative interactions. Moreover, the size of effect of these structural constraints is large if the inter-state interactions are intra-regional interactions.; These findings not only indicate that the extension of power transition theory can advance theoretical enrichment, but also implies that there is a precondition that governs the intensity of structural constraints depending on the type of interactions.