Essays on corporate ownership and governance in an emerging market

This study empirically investigates the effects on firm performance of foreign equity ownership, board independence and family ownership with panel samples of publicly traded firms from the Korea Stock Exchange.; First, the role of foreign equity investors and their effects on firm performance are examined as emerging stock markets are gradually opened to foreign investors. Empirical results show that foreign equity investors positively affect firm performance by active monitoring, complementing domestic institutional investors. It was after the government completely opened the stock market and changed regulations to improve management transparency following the Asian financial crisis that such a positive relation was realized. Foreign board members also positively affect firm performance.; Second, the relation between board independence and firm performance is examined as the authorities instituted regulatory requirements for outside directors after the Asian financial crisis. In contrast to existing studies of U.S. firms, empirical results show that the effects of independent outside directors on firm performance are significantly positive in mixed boards where firm-specific knowledge of inside directors is complemented by professional skills of gray outside directors and objective advice of independent outside directors. These results also support a view that board independence is critical in post-crisis emerging market environments, which lack sufficient market liquidity and infrastructure and which are subject to economic instability and external shocks.; While both governance mechanisms, foreign equity investors as outside blockholders and boards of directors as inside monitors, positively affect firm performance, the effects of indigenous institutions such as chaebols or family ownership are generally insignificant or negative.; Third, previous studies generally examine performance of family firms in two ways: family firms against non-family firms, or founder-controlled firms against descendant-controlled firms. It is further examined whether a cultural bias toward inheritance by first sons is relevant to firm performance. Empirical results show that family firms are positively related to firm performance. There is also a positive relation between firm performance and family firms inherited by family members other than first sons, and these firms outperform descendant-controlled firms inherited by first sons.