Antitrust at the state level: Incentives of attorneys general and determinants of multi-enforcer case durations

This research is an empirical study of the incentives of attorneys general and the determinants of case duration regarding state-level antitrust enforcement. While antitrust enforcement in the United States was founded at the state level, federal entities were the dominant enforcers for much of the twentieth century. With the resurgence of state involvement in antitrust, so too have risen the calls for policy reform and empirical questions.;Chapter two reviews the existing literature and data relevant to state antitrust enforcement. Both the economic and legal literatures are considered. What is found is a lack of empirical research into the foundation of proposed reforms. While the proposed solutions differ, the reform proposals all cite political incentives of the attorneys general and the disruptive nature of states in joint federal cases as the primary obstacles. Chapter two additionally evaluates the Multistate Litigation Database maintained by the National Association of Attorneys General as a primary source of data on state antitrust cases.;To address the matter of political incentives affecting an attorney general's antitrust behavior, chapter three builds a theoretical model of the decision an attorney general faces when a potential antitrust violation is observed. This model focuses on the decision to become involved with an antitrust suit and accounts for potential "free-rider" states joining in to the suit. Using the Multistate Litigation Database, the model is empirically tested using an ordinal probit to determine the state, case and political variables that determine the attorney general's decision. The primary results are that attorneys general do not consider joining states to be free-riders and Republicans and those with strong political backgrounds are less likely to get involved in antitrust suits; however, all attorneys general are more likely to get involved if it is a re-election year.;The second basis for reform, the disruptive nature of states in federal cases, is addressed in chapter four via duration analysis. The best measure of inefficiencies in a legal matter is the amount of time consumed. Relevant state-level antitrust cases are evaluated in an effort to determine the factors the lead to extended case durations. A non-proportional Weibull hazard model is applied to case durations to determine the impact of these factors. From this analysis we conclude that the inclusion of joining states helps to shorten case durations. Second, federal involvement helps to substantially speed case resolution in all but the shortest cases.;The chapters of this dissertation not only contribute new insight into the nature of state-level antitrust enforcement, but provide empirical evidence to guide future reform proposals. The states are becoming more active in antitrust which may lead to a greater empirical focus on it. This research empirically evaluates the political incentives that guide the attorneys general and the determinants of state-level antitrust case duration while, ideally, inspiring future research.