| My dissertation identifies four major parties in a feudal society: the ruler, the ruler's bureaucratic agents (local governments), the lords, and the peasants. In the context of Feudal China, the dissertation focuses on the landlord-peasant relationship and the landlord-local government relationship, while treating the ruler-lord relationship as exogenous. A distinctive characteristic about the landlord-peasant relationship is that the peasants and the landlords took advantage of the tax rate differentials and colluded at the expense of the fiscal revenue of the ruler. The peasants could enter dual ownership contract with the landlords to avoid land tax burden. The peasants could also enter serfdom contract with the landlords to avoid official corvée obligations. By contracting with the landlords, the peasants obtained protection and justice within the landlord's domain, but had to give up their landownership and upward mobility in the official sector. The three chapters of my dissertation can be unified under the topic of serfdom. Serfdom in Chinese history was characterized by two features: 1. Serfs had corvée obligations to their masters. Corvée obligation can be performed in the form of labor service under wage contract, shares of serf's output under share contract, or fixed rent under fixed rent contract. 2. Serfs worked for private landlords rather than local governments. Private landlord competed with local governments for corvée labor. |
