Paradoxes in worst -case thinking: Three essays in constitutional political economy |
Posted on:2004-11-19 | Degree:Ph.D | Type:Dissertation |
University:George Mason University | Candidate:Farrant, Andrew J | Full Text:PDF |
GTID:1456390011956710 | Subject:Economics |
Abstract/Summary: | |
This dissertation subjects worst-case theorizing in constitutional political to critical scrutiny. Worst-case thinking is found wanting. Chapter 1 outlines the paradox of worst-case theorizing, suggesting that constitutional political economy is best-case theorizing in another guise. Chapter 2 explains why the supposition of public-spirited planners reigned supreme throughout the socialist calculation debate. Chapter 3 charges that F. A. Hayek's critique of socialist planning is largely a failure: Hayek's Road to Serfdom (1944) makes little sense as a critique of planning. Chapter 4 suggests that classical liberal political economy fails to escape the charge of best-case theorizing: classical liberal political economists subscribing to 'politics with romance' no less readily than did the advocates of socialist planning in the 1930's. |
Keywords/Search Tags: | Political, Theorizing, Chapter |
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