Democratization and defense: Rethinking rivalry in South America

This study examines how democratization affects relations between enduring rivals, asking Why do some democratizing rivals resort to war while others take the path of cooperation? Drawing on research programs in democratization and war, enduring rivalries, and civil-military relations, I explain how democratizers use rival relations for domestic political ends, with significant consequences for both rival relations and the consolidation of democracy. I propose a theory in which attitudinal and institutional legacies of the prior authoritarian period determine the choice of rivalry strategy and the effectiveness with which it is implemented. Regime costs strongly determine the choice of strategy. The greater the political, economic or social costs of the previous regime have been, the more likely democratizing leaders are to promote liberal internationalist strategies of cooperation with rivals; in contrast, leaders emerging from a regime in which costs have been low are more likely to promote statist-nationalist strategies of conflict with rivals. The coherence of institutions of political representation determines how effectively such strategies are implemented. Cohesive institutions facilitate the effective implementation of strategies into state policies; factionalized ones hinder effective implementation. I define four ideal types of rivalry strategy that democratizing states are likely to pursue, and predict their conflict propensities. A structured, focused comparison tests the argument in case studies of four democratizing rivals: Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and Peru. Drawing upon the empirical findings, the study addresses a second question: What consequences do leaders' rivalry strategies have for the potential consolidation of democracy? The cases indicate several consequences concerning the ability of governing leaders to focus attention on other policy issues, gain public support, and secure support from neighboring states (including the rival); yet the most compelling consequence is that democratic leaders can reduce tension in civil-military relations by resolving rivalry issues peacefully and in ways also the military considers satisfactory. The cases demonstrate practical policy options that leaders in democratizing states and the international community can exercise to encourage peaceful resolution of rivalries and to constructively advance democratic political control of the military.