Canadian Federalism, Abeyances, and Quebec Sovereignty

This dissertation examines the changing patterns of intergovernmental relations among political elites toward sensitive constitutional issues implicated in the Quebec sovereignty movement, in particular after the 1995 referendum on Quebec sovereignty-association. It extends David Thomas' concept of constitutional "abeyances" to suggest that areas of constitutional ambiguity over which there are strong enough disagreements to lead to a national breakup can be successfully managed given enough political will. This depends on their being enough political actors who otherwise share a common interest in national unity willing to keep abeyances from escalating into a crisis. The exposure and politicization of such abeyances in the middle of the 20th century raised the salience of constitutional disagreements in Canada nearly to the point of national disintegration. The decline in the salience of these abeyances and the waning of support for sovereignty in Quebec since the last referendum has reduced this possibility substantially. Using a mixed method approach within an historical institutionalist framework, this dissertation argues that, along with other social forces, this is partially explicable in light of the fact actors such as the courts, federalist political leaders, and their parties have been willing to avoid discussing sensitive constitutional abeyances and leave them unresolved in the interests of avoiding a constitutional crisis. This has certainly not resulted in end of the sovereignty movement in Quebec, which remains very much alive. However, along with other political and social forces the willingness to keep deep constitutional disagreements camouflaged has permitted Canadian federalism to regain a measure of stability.