Corruption in law enforcement, public policy and underdevelopment

This dissertation seeks to explain widespread corruption in law enforcement in underdeveloped economies; it also analyzes the effects of punishment and anticorruption policies on deterrence and corruption when apprehension effort is endogenous and bribery, extortion and framing are possible. A case study of traffic violations in Mexico City is presented. General finding are: Bribery lowers severity of punishment but increases its certainty, so it is not necessarily deterrence diluting, as are extortion and framing. It is not possible to have zero violations if corruptible authorities influence certainty of apprehension. Increasing certainty may be more efficient than increasing severity, since the latter motivates bribery, extortion and framing, while the former does not do so simultaneously. In raising certainty of punishment, rewards for decreases in the violation level are more efficient than rewards per arrest, which increase extortion and framing. When apprehension effort is endogenous, bribery, extortion and framing should be punished. Anticorruption policies for bribery weaken the incentives for apprehension effort and thus diminish certainty of punishment, so they should be complemented with reward schemes. Decreasing extortion and framing may more efficiently increase deterrence than increasing severity of punishment or implementing rewards per arrest.