| This dissertation seeks to understand the settlement and escalation of territorial disputes, focusing specifically on disputes involving China. Since 1949, China has defused or resolved 18 of its 23 territorial disputes, usually receiving 50 percent or less of contested land in the final settlement. China has resorted to force in 5 of its disputes, but has usually not seized large amounts of land. To account for this variation, I develop a theory of settlement strategies to explain why leaders cooperate or escalate in territorial disputes.; Leaders are more likely to compromise when exogenous shocks sharply increase the opportunity costs of delaying—costs which usually involve forgoing more cooperative diplomatic relations with important states. Under these conditions, leaders have powerful incentives to compromise in the hopes that by agreeing to concessions over territory they will receive cooperation that helps to address the problem posed by the exogenous shock.{09}By contrast, leaders are more likely to use force in territorial disputes through two separate pathways: to signal resolve when they perceive their position in a dispute as under threat, or to make gains when changes in the strategic context open windows of opportunity that increase the potential pay-offs of using force.; Domestic shocks explain all but one of China's many compromise attempts, illustrating the dynamics of a ‘diversionary peace.’ When faced with domestic threats, especially ethnic unrest, China's leaders have been much more willing to offer concessions in exchange for cooperation that strengthens their regime internally in ethnic frontier regions. China's leaders have usually escalated to signal resolve when they see military and diplomatic trends as weakening their position in a particular dispute. Over Taiwan, for example, China's leaders have used force when increased US military support for the island or domestic trends favoring independence were seen as threatening the achievement of national unification. |
