| The purpose of this study was to examine how emergency response insiders within a particular major metropolitan area perceive risk and define worst-case scenarios and how those perceptions drive contingency planning. Participants included local emergency responders and planners, State and Federal On-Scene Coordinators and Environmental, Health and Safety Managers at large chemical facilities covered by Risk Management Program requirements. Using a qualitative design, 20 participants were individually and confidentially interviewed using partially structured interviews. Data analysis clearly illustrates the active influences of numerous sociological theories of organizational deviance within this participant group, with dominant roles played by risk disqualification, political sense making and conflict over risk acceptability. Respondents were deeply divided over fundamental issues, relying heavily on the use of "common sense," but unable to agree on what that is or whose version should prevail. Defining worst-case scenarios and reliance on experts and contingency plans were contentious issues, and the public is generally perceived as having forfeited any significant role in the process. As a practical matter risk remains underestimated and subjectively managed. Stakeholders are advised to engage and increase awareness and knowledge of the process to develop a mutually agreeable definition of acceptable risk as a foundation for planning. Regulations and contingency plans are necessary, but are not complete solutions. The ability to improvise and build on existing structure and resources is a valuable asset. |
