Talking Turkey: The Turkish parliament in two Iraq wars

This dissertation investigates Turkish foreign policy during two Iraq wars by focusing on the role of the Turkish parliament. In the Gulf War (1991), Turkey opened its bases to American aircraft used to attack Iraq. In contrast, during the War on Iraq (2003), Turkey did not allow the United States to use its bases, but opened its airspace. These foreign policy outcomes diverged from what the governments chose, as, in both occasions, the executive decisions produced by utilitarian calculations were to engage in wars along with the United States. In this dissertation, I argue that the divergence between the government choices and the actual policy outcomes can partly be explained by the opposition in the parliament against Turkey's involvement in the Iraq wars. The opposition, by successfully manipulating Turkey's anti-Western history, was able to trim the executive choice of embroiling Turkey in the Gulf War. The effect of the parliamentary opposition was even more dramatic in the War on Iraq as the Turkish parliament reversed the executive choice to deploy American troops in Turkey. As a result, Turkey remained out of the war. Therefore, this dissertation argues that parliament is a key player in Turkey's decisions for military action. Finally, the discursive construction of competing images of meaning of war and peace, the power structure of deciding military action in Turkey, and decision making rules in the parliament are three key variables that should be carefully scrutinized to understand Turkish foreign policy during the two Iraq wars.