Political regimes and welfare state development in East Asia: How state leaders matter to social policy expansion in Taiwan, Thailand, and China

My dissertation addresses two fundamental political puzzles in the welfare state literature. First, why and how do welfare state institutions develop in cases where state leaders assume relatively powerful positions vis-a-vis societal actors---circumstances where the leading society-centered theories of the welfare state do not apply? These include cases where labor unions are weak, employer's associations are disunited, and the role of the states is predominant. Second, how do political regime type and regime transition, particularly from autocracy to democracy, matter to the development of welfare states? In response to these weaknesses in the existing literature, I introduce an alternative argument of state-led welfare state development, hypothesizing strategic choices likely to be pursued by state leaders under different scenarios in which a policy-making process for social policy reform takes place. State leaders, facing different types and varying degrees of pressure, including regime changes, pursue strategies to develop welfare state institutions like health care and pension systems. I explore why regardless of the scenario they encounter, state leaders stop short of completion and leave the welfare state systems 'incomplete.'; In my study, I select the cases of three emerging economies in East Asia, namely Taiwan, Thailand, and China, for detailed analysis. These cases have since the 1990s undergone a transformation in their social security systems. My study of these cases is based primarily on on-site research and approximately 60 in-depth interviews. The analysis also includes secondary statistical data and surveys obtained during my fieldwork. The three national eases were chosen strategically to represent different scenarios in which state leaders spearheaded the making and the reforming of social policies. I assume that state leaders are rational, self-interested actors who act as 'political entrepreneurs' mainly for their own sake. A comparative study of the cases indicates that where state leaders dominated the policy-making process, social policy outcomes primarily reflected the policy choice based on their preferences. However, it also demonstrates the effect of 'path dependence' or 'policy feedback' of the existing social welfare system that has institutionalized political leverage for other relevant actors to influence the final outcome of social policy reform. In order to obtain the fundamental goals of their ideal policy choice, state leaders in the end tend to compromise and face the possibility of yielding to their counterparts more than they might want to. The outcome of social policy reform is contingent upon the policy choice that state leaders prefer and their strength in obtaining it.